People hold a Ukrainian flag during a solidarity demonstration to support Ukraine, in Budapest, Hungary, 2 March 2025. REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

As we pass the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – and mark the 12th year of Russia’s war in Ukraine – the term ‘transitional justice’ has begun to take on a totemic significance in discussions about Ukraine’s future.

For some of Ukraine’s partners, the focus on transitional justice is meant to highlight how challenging the post-war situation in Ukraine will be for Ukrainian authorities. For others, it seems like an effort to prepare Ukraine for the anticipated disappointment of a general failure by the international community to support holding Russia fully to account for its atrocity crimes in Ukraine. The broad spectrum across which the term ‘transitional justice’ is being applied is both lessening the deep importance of delivering true transitional justice to Ukraine, and ascribing to it possibilities and capabilities that it does not have. This is a recipe for failure that Ukraine cannot afford.

As such, it is vital for Ukraine to define its own vision for transitional justice that will deliver for the Ukrainian people, address the concerns of Ukraine’s international partners as one element of finalising Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and begin to build a foundation for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

First and foremost, transitional justice is about establishing processes that can adequately address the kinds of mass scale human rights violations that have defined Russia’s conduct on the battlefield, its war against Ukrainian civilians and its execution of the occupation of temporarily held territories of Ukraine.

This can only be achieved by understanding how we arrived at this point, and the critical elements that define Ukrainian initiatives to hold Russia to account for its illegal war of aggression.

First, Ukrainians built international support for their survival as a state and a people by showing the world that Russian defeat is possible and demanding Russian accountability. This informational element of the war is deeply felt by all Ukrainians, who also understand by now that the full-scale invasion could only ever have been possible in an environment where false Russian narratives were believed by too many for too long. They know the best way to ensure that this cannot be repeated is to show what Russia has done, exposing the lies of their narratives and the truth of their real objective – to erase the Ukrainian nation.

Second, the period of the full-scale invasion is widely considered to be the most documented war in history. Ukrainians have shown the world the atrocities that Russia commits against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians in real-time, and they have collected terabytes of evidence to ensure that Russia can be held to account. This evidence must be preserved and it cannot be ignored.

Third, as of mid-March 2025, almost 155,000 Russian war crimes have been registered to be investigated and prosecuted. These crimes have primarily been committed by Russian forces on Ukrainian territory. As Ukrainians have reclaimed land, relatives, prisoners of war and stolen children from Russian custody, they have been able to hear and document the stories of torture and atrocities first-hand. This is their knowledge, and their stories. Supporting this has been the work of Ukraine’s war crimes investigators and prosecutors, who have worked throughout the war to gather evidence, document crimes, identify perpetrators and prepare cases against them. The work of these investigators and prosecutors is raising standards across the Ukrainian justice system, and it is incorporating unprecedented innovation.

The burden of delivering justice

Fourth, bulk of the burden of delivering justice for Ukrainians will be and must be carried by the Ukrainian state and its institutions. This has informed every step that Ukraine has taken. Ukrainian prosecutors have thus far identified 821 suspects, issued 587 indictments and convicted 151 people on war crimes charges in Ukrainian courts. An additional 457 indictments have been issued for charges relating to the crime of aggression – the ‘anchor’ case connecting Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine – with 210 people already convicted by Ukrainian courts. Ukraine is applying new technologies to collect and categorise evidence and build collective cases on war crimes charges. But Ukraine’s international partners – and indeed all supporters of international human rights law – must understand what is at stake in this process.

When Ukrainian investigators interview Russian prisoners of war, almost none of them have heard of the Geneva Conventions. If Russia and the states that seek to emulate Russia are allowed to continuing operating outside the rules established at the conclusion of the Second World War, their vision of power will permanently undermine the rules-based order, the alliances that have thrived within it and the world where right isn’t just about might.

Ukrainians have been fighting to revitalise that system since 2014. After victory, Ukrainians want a more just society that represents their shared sacrifice for Ukraine’s survival. In my years as Prosecutor General, I came to understand how deeply this justice must be delivered for them. It could never have waited until ‘after’ – it had to be now. Every day was a chance to show Ukrainians what they were fighting for. And we have tried to give this to them by tirelessly pursuing full accountability for Russian war crimes and using the necessity of those efforts to accomplish critical reforms to the justice sector that Ukrainians have long been waiting for.

But let us be clear: the most critical components of transitional justice cannot be achieved in Ukraine if the international community urges Ukraine not to pursue a full assessment of Russia’s modern atrocities against Ukraine or chooses not to pursue Russian leadership crimes. Any Ukrainian government that attempts to weaken the accountability process will undermine public trust in the government and its institutions of justice, leave deep social wounds to fester in society, limit the potential of post-war reconciliation and undermine sustainable peace. The progress that has been made in transforming how Ukrainians interact with the justice system, via the changes implemented to facilitate the prosecution of Russian war crimes, will be undone.

The starting point of transitional justice is thus that Ukraine will pursue accountability for Russian war crimes for as long as it takes. A concrete and effective vision of transitional justice in Ukraine is formulated outward from that point, further detailing its foundations, principles and specific mechanisms in order to build trust in its implementation and outcomes among Ukrainian citizens liberated from Russian occupation and international experts alike. In this process, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine must have a clear position and a strong voice to ensure the protection of state interests, citizens' rights and the rule of law.

The Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG), as one of the key institutions in Ukraine's criminal justice system – responsible for upholding public prosecution and representing the interests of the state in courts – plays a crucial role during wartime in ensuring justice and achieving a just peace. It will remain one of the most important stakeholders in any post-war settlement. The OPG has worked to develop solutions and elevate the issues of transitional justice and the distribution of responsibilities between state and non-state institutions to the highest level. This broad base of stakeholders has been vital for achieving progress.

The OPG prioritises detailed investigations of war crimes and developing mechanisms to ensure compensation for damages, punishment of perpetrators and the prevention of future crimes. It has designed appropriate implementation cycles during the war itself, meaning neither a prolonged transitional period nor extensive post-war implementation will be required. This approach has been driven by the objective fact that the criminal justice system and other related systems could not cease their activities even during the full-scale war, and they could not delay, complicate or disrupt the establishment of any potential post-war justice by being unprepared. The OPG has already significantly contributed to upholding and restoring the international legal order and holding Russian aggressors accountable in international courts. Arrest warrants issued by the ICC for President Putin, his top generals and other Russian officials were born from the work of Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors.

Enormous volume of war crimes

Given the enormous volume of Russian war crimes, the OPG has focused on developing an architecture for achieving a just peace that separates issues of criminal, administrative, reputational and other types of responsibility, while clearly identifying the institutions and bodies responsible for each.

All key components of transitional justice must be ensured conceptually (at the level of legal norms), methodologically (through the development of mechanisms, procedures and algorithms) and institutionally (by establishing appropriate bodies with sufficient resources), as well as maintained in unimpeded functional interaction. Public and international engagement in the newly created transitional justice system must be no less of a priority for Ukrainian civil society and international partners as the fight against corruption. Indeed, in my experience, the attempts to address war crimes has strengthened aspects of the justice system that will improve the fight against corruption.

Ukraine is, of course, necessarily realistic about what can be accomplished. In the context of a deep crisis of trust in the international system of security and justice (including the UN and its bodies and courts), and in considering the limited effectiveness of the established concept of transitional justice, it is appropriate to align any framework for transitional justice as closely as possible with the concept of just peace. This alignment should incorporate the key norms of international law (including the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute) and effective mechanisms for achieving justice for specific individuals.

It is in understanding the necessity of delivering justice not only to the Ukrainian state but to specific individuals that the OPG found inspiration to define much of its work since 2022. The OPG pushed for the establishment of a register of damage where individual Ukrainian victims can register losses to themselves and their businesses – a first step in ensuring fair reparations for victims are paid out by the aggressor. The OPG has also worked hard to develop and implement a victim-centric approach in its war crimes work, which is a significant reform within the Ukrainian justice system. The establishment of the Coordination Center for the Support of Victims and Witnesses – with an office in Kyiv and offices in nine frontline regions – has transformed how prosecutors interact with victims and witnesses, helping to ensure they have all the support they need during legal proceedings and in finding practical aid. Ukrainians have begun to see that the process of the state is for them – to deliver justice for them – and this will have a lasting impact across Ukrainian society and in any future Ukrainian justice systems.

To ensure a just peace, the state must develop, adopt and effectively communicate clear and understandable principles of transitional justice. At this stage, key state authorities and institutions responsible for performing specific critical functions of transitional justice must also be identified to ensure trust in its implementation. It is essential to build a convincing system of legal and social justice that will not be perceived as a political slogan or a lofty idea but as a practical, established system of criminal justice and non-criminal measures for the restoration of citizens' rights. To this end, criminal justice bodies must work closely with other actors (in the informational, memorial, archival, fiscal, cultural, educational and other spheres) from both the state and non-state sectors to build a whole society approach.

Three additional but equally crucial aspects of achieving broad citizen engagement in the processes of implementing transitional justice are: highly public courts and tribunals; the introduction of facilitated integration dialogues; and wide access to archival and other information related to the war, acts of collaboration with the occupiers and documents shedding light on the daily activities and crimes of the Russian occupation administration.

The central focus of reflection must remain on the culpability of the aggressor state and all those citizens who have, in one way or another, contributed to Russia's war against Ukraine. The actions and inactions that made the full-scale invasion possible must be weighed to prevent future aggression. At the same time, the highest standards of documentation, evidence-gathering and prosecution for criminal offenses must be upheld so that timely judicial decisions not only result from spectacular adversarial processes but also inspire politicians, writers, college professors and others.

In practice, fostering a new culture where courts and tribunals are seen as an important public social institution (via broad discussions and prime time broadcasts) and where there is broad access to searchable archival materials documenting war crimes and life under occupation will help to effectively communicate complex social issues, expand tools for understanding and increase trust in the decisions of the state and the professional community. The stories and experiences of Ukrainians must be available for a new generation of scholars, writers, historians and experts to help make sense of what has happened and what must come next.

What every Ukrainian understands is that peace will not be real without justice, and justice can never come until Russia is forced to confront its past as the pathway to its present.

The international human rights law I speak of in this article, and which we rely on to make sense of war and peace today, was born from the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Russia has always remained outside this system of laws because it has not sufficiently confronted its own crimes of empire building, occupation and terror from the last century. Belarusians, Estonians, Georgians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and so many more have spent the decades since 1991 trying to reassemble the history that Moscow took from us. We have tried to tell the stories of the disappeared, executed and starved millions who still have so little voice in the history of Moscow’s USSR.

As Ukrainians we understand what it means that Russia’s Soviet atrocities were not properly accounted for. The true death toll remains unknown. Millions of Ukrainians were executed or deported – others died from Stalin’s policy of starvation – and there were never any trials, never any lustration. The better part of a century later, that history is just beginning to be known. Moscow has not had to account for its history of atrocities in Ukraine. In fact, a significant part of Moscow’s perpetual propaganda machinery goes to rewriting history, so as to present these crimes as a sacrifice that somehow made Moscow great.

Those methods of subjugation and internal control conducted in Ukraine that were never put on trial remain core tactics in Russia’s operational manuals. And every day, with efficiency and precision, the organised terror of Russia’s occupation targets more civilians living in Russian-held territories in Ukraine. It’s hard not to see the direct line from the absence of an equivalent to the Nuremberg Trials for Moscow’s crimes during the Soviet period to the atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine today.

There’s a century of crimes that Moscow might never be held to account for, but the crimes since 2014 must finally bring accountability to Russia and bring Russia into the system of international human rights law. This is the best way to end impunity for Russia, and to build a lasting peace in Ukraine and for all of Russia’s neighbours.