The third and final annual phase of the China-aided Cambodia landmine elimination project began in March. The Chinese government’s non-repayable $4.4m grant is funding the clearance of more than 3,400 hectares of land affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance across seven provinces in the Southeast Asian nation.

Beijing’s continued commitment to the elimination of landmines in Cambodia has been particularly welcomed by the country’s government given the decision of US president Donald Trump’s administration to suspend more than $10m in mine clearance assistance. The project is emblematic, therefore, of how China is poised to fill the vacuum left as the US retreats from world leadership.

Early this year, President Trump issued an executive order for a 90-day pause in foreign development assistance, pending a review of efficiencies and consistency with the foreign policy goals of his administration. This executive order will affect critical development projects in areas such as water, sanitation and shelter.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had previously called for all US spending abroad to only continue if it makes America ‘stronger’, ‘safer’ or ‘more prosperous’. By early March, thousands of US Agency for International Development (USAID) delivery contracts had been terminated. Over a number of decades, USAID has funded major UN agencies, supported significant basic healthcare programmes and accounted for 40 per cent of global foreign aid.

Charles Yi Zhan, an officer of the IBA International Trade and Customs Law Committee, is hopeful that much needed aid programmes will resume after the 90-day pause. ‘To the extent that the suspension becomes more than that – and is part of the new US administration’s stance on international organisations […] and efforts to instil an “America First” based policy – this will be a shock and potentially a sustained change to which the world will need to adapt,’ he says.

Wong says China probably won’t attach the same human rights conditions on its aid as the US formerly did. ‘But it may impose more political conditions,’ he explains. ‘For instance, Pacific countries [may be] persuaded to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in exchange for security or defence cooperation, or Thailand [could be] persuaded to deport Uyghurs back to China.’

Beijing created the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), or China Aid, in 2018 to streamline its spending, including in respect of its foreign investment programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that CIDCA offers aid ‘without political conditions’ and in alignment with the needs of its partners, a government press release at the time of CIDCA’s launch said the new agency would ‘further the effectiveness of aid as a key foreign policy instrument.’

China has a long-standing policy of prioritising pragmatism over altruism, and it may not have the experience of USAID in supporting local groups in terms of financials. China is, however, good at technology and knowledge sharing. ‘Chinese investment into infrastructure in developing countries can have wide-ranging benefits for the locals in those areas – for instance, telecom towers built for government purposes can increase information flows and market access while electric power lines along a road or railway can also provide lighting,’ says Wong. ‘And such infrastructure projects can create meaningful jobs and, over time, lead to a skills transfer from Chinese state-owned enterprises to local companies in these areas.’

The cuts to US foreign development aid will restore China as the world’s largest bilateral development partner and provide it with the perfect opportunity to rethink and renew its soft power projects – such as the BRI – at a time when it faces slowing economic growth and rising youth unemployment. ‘China probably has an incentive to deflect attention away from its domestic challenges,’ says Wong, though he notes it remains unclear if the country has the ability to do so given how expensive these external investment activities will probably be.

In an increasingly fractured world of realpolitik, China has been given the chance to resume its transglobal leadership role, says Zhan, who’s Head of International Trade at Moulis Legal in Australia. ‘China has at least been consistent on the international stage, and consistency can build the kind of trust that the US will inevitably lose if it maintains its present stance,’ he says.

‘China has steadfastly upheld its foreign policies that support its core national interest,’ adds Zhan. ‘But those interests are balanced by, and are more compatible with, development-orientated relationship building. Where it might have “gone wrong” in the eyes of the international community is where aid or investment-receiving countries have not been well-advised and have landed themselves with a cost headache, or where the project delivery did not give adequate consideration to building social licence.’

M Ravi, an officer on the IBA Human Rights Law Committee, highlights that, in contrast to that given by the West, China’s aid ‘focuses on “no-strings-attached” agreements, which can be appealing to local governments but often come with challenges like debt dependency and environmental harm. This approach has [drawn] criticism from civil society groups and opposition movements for disregarding human rights and democratic governance.’
 

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